Experimental Evidence on Group Size Effects in Network Formation Games
Social Structure, State, and Economic Activity
Status Consumption in Networks: A Reference Dependent Approach
We introduce loss aversion into a model of conspicuous consumption in networks. Agents allocate heterogeneous incomes between a conventional good and a status good. They interact over a connected network and compare their status consumption to their neighbors’ average consumption. We find that aversion to lying below the social reference point has a profound impact. If loss aversion is large relative to income heterogeneity, a continuum of conformist Nash equilibria emerges.
Interconnected Conflict
We study a model of conflict with multiple battlefields and the possibility of investments spillovers between the battlefields. Results of conflicts at the individual battlefields are determined by the Tullock contest success function based on efforts assigned to a battlefield as well as efforts spilling over from the neighbouring battlefields. We characterize Nash equilibria of this model and uncover a network invariance result: equilibrium payoffs, equilibrium total expenditure, and equilibrium probabilities of winning individual battlefields are independent of the network of spillovers.
Networks Workshop - Patrick Allmis (Cambridge)
Title: "Homophily and Specialization in Networks" (with Luca Merlino)
Networks Workshop - Shane Mahen (Cambridge)
Title: “Optimal Monetary Policy during the Clean Transition”