Interconnected Conflict

We study a model of conflict with multiple battlefields and the possibility of investments spillovers between the battlefields. Results of conflicts at the individual battlefields are determined by the Tullock contest success function based on efforts assigned to a battlefield as well as efforts spilling over from the neighbouring battlefields. We characterize Nash equilibria of this model and uncover a network invariance result: equilibrium payoffs, equilibrium total expenditure, and equilibrium probabilities of winning individual battlefields are independent of the network of spillovers.

Experimental Evidence on the Relation Between Network Centrality and Individual Choice

Social interactions shape individual behavior and public policy increasingly uses networks to improve effectiveness. It is therefore important to understand if the theoretical predictions on the relation between networks and individual choice are empirically valid. This paper tests a key result in the theory of games on networks: an individual’s action is proportional to their (Bonacich) centrality. Our experiment shows that individual efforts increase in centrality but at a rate of increase that is lower than the theoretical prediction.

The Dynamics of Social Identity, Inequality and Redistribution

We provide a politico-economic theory of income redistribution with endogenous social identity of voters. Our analysis uncovers a non-monotonic relationship between market income inequality and redistributive taxation in line with the mixed evidence on the sign of their empirical relationship: taxation first increases with wage inequality as all voters identify with others, but then drops sharply as affluent voters switch to identify in-group. We further add ethnicity as an identification attribute.

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